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trato perfeito, que compensa o neg6cio cau~ 
sal que nao tiver seguido a forma estipula~ 
da. 0 C6digo Civil chega a urn resultado 
semelhante, mas percorre urn caminho bern 
diferente na sua resolu~ao do caso concre~ 
to, e nao menciona, por exemplo, o prind~ 
pio da separa~ao de negoctos 
(Abstraktionsprinzip). A transferencia de 
direitos reais e efetuada atraves de contra~ 
tos. A perfei~ao destes exige necessariamen~ 
te o acordo entre as partes, e este por sua 
vez torna~se perfeito somente ap6s a exe~ 
137. ZweigertiKOtz, pag. 608. 
138. HOrster, nota 1008. 
Erasmo Marcos Ramos 
cu~ao do ato material (na maioria das ve~ 
zes a transmissao da propriedade). Desta 
forma, 0 direito portugues nao diferencia 
entre neg6cio obrigacional e dispositivo. 137 
Para a prote~ao de {erceiros de boa~fe, exa~ 
mina~se o direito adquirido separadamente 
do primeiro neg6cio, entretanto, isto s6 
ocorre em casas restritos e previstos por 
lei. 138 Este direito adquirido de terceiros que 
mere cern prote~ao parece ser a alma gemea 
do neg6cio abstrato, que e, contudo, des~ 
conhecido do diploma portugues. 
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Reviewing European Business 
Law: the Difficulty of Globa~ 
Awareness and in Selection of 
the Most Relevant 
-~ o design business strategies under 
411f''' European Community law, one must 
'-''*' •' constantly and keenly be aware of 
new developments. It is only one aspect to 
cope with the acribic and ever growing out~ 
put of the European Community legislator 
~ the legendary Brussels "papermill". What 
a businessperson also needs to know is: How 
do the European bureaucrats understand 
and instrumentalize legislative texts in a eli~ 
mate that is so heavily influenced by poli~ 
tics and lobbying as Brussels? That means 
that business persons need to be informed 
about what the European Commission is 
thinking and how the European courts in 
Luxembourg will possibly react. This will 
not only help them to solve problems, but 
also prevent problems from developing. 
Community competition and inter~ 
national trade law is expanding at such a 
rate that more and more law is developing 
in increasingly less and less time. To illus~ 
trate, supplements to authoritative works 
on EC competition law ~ such as the infa~ 
mous Bellamy and Child on European anti~ 
trust law ~ are now as long as the first 
editions of said books. The quantity of de~ 
cisions and other important texts keeps 
multiplying, especially decisions by the Eu~ 
ropean Court of First Instance. This poses 
the formidable problem of weeding their~ 
relevant out from the relevant, and the rei~ 
evant from the very relevant. The material 
selected for this essay was chosen particu~ 
larly with an eye to the potential needs of 
Japanese business exporters. With this in 
mind, I have done my best to include 
most important and up~to~date issues m 
European antitrust and international trade 
law. 
I. Antitrust 
A. Generalities 
The European Community is one of 
limited powers; these powers fall short of 
those of a state (see Articles 3b (1) and 4 
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( 1), second sentence of the EC Treaty and 
Article E of the Treaty on European Com, 
munity). The limited powers principle must 
be respected in both the internal action and 
the international action of the Community. 1 
In the area of antitrust, the limited 
powers principle means that Community 
institutions must confine their measures to 
those which are necessary to achieve 
undistorted and fair competition in the in, 
ternal market (see Article 3b (3) in con, 
junction with Article 3 lit. g and the Fourth 
Recital of the EC Treaty). Undistorted and 
fair competition in turn must inure to the 
benefit of the consumer alone , and not to 
the benefit of industry. 
1. Approaches of the Community 
Despite the limited powers principle, 
in practice, the ambition of Community 
action is to widen Community power with 
the aspiration to turn the Community into 
a Quasi, state, and to reduce Member State 
power accordingly. 
One means to enlarge the Commu, 
nity powers, and especially those of the 
Commission, are the antitrust provisions set 
out in Articles 85 et seq. of the EC Treaty 
and most notably Article 85: Article 85 (1) 
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contains a ban on competition,restricting 
practices. This ban is so broad that, based 
on its wording alone, it could catch even 
simple sales agreements , on the grounds 
that the seller is bound vis,a,vis the pur, 
chaser, and hence prevented from selling 
to a third party. Article 85 (3) in turn en, 
dows the Commission with the exclusive 
power to declare the ban on competition, 
restricting practices inapplicable if, in the 
Commission's opinion, the positive effects 
of the arrangement under consideration 
outweigh the negative ones (power to grant 
exemption). Neither the Community 
Courts nor the Member States can exercise 
this power; it is the Commission's monopoly. 
Also, the Commission has a wide discre, 
tion as to whether or not to grant exemp, 
tions; judicial review concerning exemption 
decisions is very limited.2 
Within this legal framework, the 
Commission shows a tendency to quickly 
affirm a competition,restricting practice 
within the meaning of Article 85 (1). Af, 
firming, with limited examination, a com, 
petition, restricting practice "brings the case 
home" to the Commission's almost unre, 
viewable power to grant exemptions under 
Article 85 (3) .3 The Commission then has 
almost "carte blanche". It can ask the par, 
1. Opinion 2194 of the ECJ of March 28, 1996 (Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms) [1996] ECR 1-1759, point 24. 
2. See, e.g., Case 7/93 Langnese-lglo v. Commission [1995] ECR 11-1533, point 178: "The Commission's exclusive power ... to grant 
an exemption under Article 85 (3) of the Treaty necessarily involves complex evaluations on economic matters. A judicial review of 
such evaluations must take account of their nature by confining itself to an examination of the relevance of the facts and of the 
legal inferences drawn by the Commission from them. The judicial review must therefore in the first place be carried out in respect 
of the reasons given for the decisions, which must set out the facts and considerations on which the said evaluations are based. 
... It is in the light of those principles, as expounded in the case law, that it is necessary to verify whether the decision is based on 
a materially incorrect appreciation of the facts or is vitiated by errors of law or manifest errors of assessment .. ." 
3. See, generally, van der Woude, Decentralization, National Authorities and National Courts, speech given at the IBC Conference 
on European Antitrust, 1996, p. 14; Gerrit Schohe/Mark Hoenike, Die Rechtsprechung von EuGH und EuG zu staatlichen Beihilfen 
in den Jahren 1996 und 1997; EuZW Europaische ZeitschriftfOrWirtschaftsrecht 1997, p. 742; see in particular for this trend in the 
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ties to the arrangement to restructure, 
modify, or abandon this arrangement as the 
Commission deems best. This paves the way 
from the protection of "undistorted and fair 
competition", to which the Commission is 
confined under the limited powers princi, 
ple, to politically motivated shaping of the 
industry and its structures by the Commis, 
sion. 
Legal scholars, for example Valentine 
Korah\ have over and over insisted that a 
competition,restricting practice in many 
cases cannot be affirmed simply on the ba, 
sis of allegation, conjecture or remote pos, 
sibilities.5 Such an affirmation, in their 
opinion, requires most often market ap.aly, 
sis. Also, some "rule of reason" should' be 
acknowledged. Under such a rule, Article 
85 (1) would be inapplicable where the ar, 
rangement can be justified whilst taking full 
account of "fair and undistorted competi, 
tion". Where market analysis or the rule of 
reason shows that the arrangement has no 
appreciable effect on competition or trade 
between the Member States, the Commis, 
sion cannot simply rush to Article 85 (3) 
to restructure industrial arrangements. 
The leading case in which the ECJ 
insisted on market analysis is Delimitis.6 
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However, this case does not seem to have 
essentially changed the Commission's 
power,oriented policy. To a considerable 
extent, what is allowed or forbidden con, 
tinues to depend more on politics and 
skillful lobbying than on law. Parties, espe, 
cially from outside the European Community, 
should be aware of this when seeking antitrust 
approval by the Commission. One example 
may be the establishment in the European 
Community of a selective distribution net, 
work. In a combined legal and lobbying effort, 
the parties must give their project some Euro, 
pean spin to win the Commission's political 
sympathy and, ultimately, approval. 7 
The Commission's antitrust ap, 
proach is indifferent from the one taken by 
the Community Courts. The next section 
will deal with the fact that the Community 
courts tend towards a more legalistic ap, 
proach. 
2. Approaches of the 
European Court 
The Commission's strife for antitrust 
power in certain cases clashed with the ap, 
proach of the Community courts to Article 
85. 
commission's antitrust policy in the banking and insurance sector: Luc Gyselen, EU Antitrust Law in the Area of Financial Services 
-Capita Selecta for the Cautious Shaping of a Policy, in: International Antitrust Law, and Policy 1996, Fordham Corp. LJust (Barry 
Hawck, ed. 1996), p. 337 et seq., 344, 356, 367 et seq., 385. 
4. See e.g. Valentine Korah, Warwick A. Rothnie, Exclusive Distribution and the EEC Competition Rules, Chapter 7.2.; see also e.g. 
Luc Gyselen, supra note 3, p. 392. 
5. As authority for the contention that such relaxed tests are insufficient see Article 3.6 of the WTO Agreement on Implementation of 
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. Under this provision, a determination of material injury (in the 
sense of anti-dumping law) shall be based on facts and not merely on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. This rule seems 
sound in all market-related assessments, and one should always rely on it to encourage the Community institutions and Courts to 
adopt a stricter standard of judicial review. 
6. Case C-234/85 Delimitis v. Henninger[1991] ECR 1-935, points 14 et seq. 
7. See, generally, Schohe, European Lobbying and the Law: Disinterested Twins?, Public Affairs newsletter, July I August 1996, Vol. 
2 No. 10, p. 6 et seq. 
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Traditionally, the Commission has 
analyzed agreements that may restrict com, 
petition in terms of whether the agreement 
limits the commercial freedom of any of the 
contracting parties and whether the agree, 
ment has negative effects on the position 
of competitors or consumers. This test is 
referred to as the freedom of action theory. 8 
The Commission generally limits itself to 
an assessment of the status of the agree, 
ment in question in relation to Article 
85(1). The Commission's approach is rather 
abstract and fails to look at the actual re, 
sults of the restrictive behaviour in light of 
the market conditions. Since this brings the 
case to the Commission's almost um:eview, 
able power to grant exemptions under Ar, 
tide 85 (3), as mentioned above, it can be 
assumed that the Commission is led by the 
consideration to retain as much power as 
possible 
The approach of the Community 
courts to Article 85 contrasts with that of 
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the Commission in that the investigation 
whether an agreement restricts competition 
takes place in two stages.9 First, the Com, 
munity courts examine whether the ar, 
rangement under consideration does not 
have as its objective the restriction of com, 
petition, i.e. whether it restricts competi, 
tion per se. Such would be the case with 
"deadly sins" like price fixing 10• Second, 
where there is no restriction of competition 
per se, the Courts assess the effect that the 
agreement may have on competition as the 
ECJ did in Delimitis. 11 This effect is to be 
determined on the basis of the general cri, 
terion of how competition would have de, 
veloped in the absence of the 
arrangement. 12 The Community Courts 
have consistently supported the economic 
analysis of the impact of the arrangement 
on the market in question. 13 For example, 
the ECJ has held that compatibility with 
Article 85 (1) of the non, competition 
8. See for example Deacon "Vertical Restraints under EU Competition Law: New Directions" (1995) speech delivered at the Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute; Hawk "System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law" (1995) 32 CML Rev. at 973. Illustrative · 
in this respect is the Commission's 23rd Report on Competition Policy 1993, point 212, in which the Commission states that, the 
exclusive nature of a contractual relationship between a producer and a distributor is viewed as re~tricting competition, since it 
limits the parties' freedom of action on the territory covered." This test primarily relates to the restriction of the freedom of the 
contracting parties. Its application has particularly been criticized by, for example, Van Houtte "A Standard of Reason in EEC 
Antitrust Law: Some Comments on the Application of Parts 1 and 3 of Article 85" (1982) Northwestern Journal of International Law 
& Business 497 and V. Korah An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 5th edn, 1994, ch 
14.2.2, who hold that the test is intrinsically wrong since any commercial transaction ipso facto restricts a party's freedom to enter 
into a similar transaction. 
9. See, for example, Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235 and Case C-234/89 Delimitis v. 
Henniger Brau [1991] ECR 1-935. 
10. This test requires an investigation of the objectives of the agreement and purpose considered in the economic context in which it 
operates, see, for example, Cases 29-30/83, Zinc Producers v. Commission (1984) ECR 1679. 
11. Supra footnote 5. 
12. See, for example, Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm, supra footnote 5 and Case T-61/89 Dansk Pelsdyravler v. 
Commission [1992] ECR 11-1931. In order to fall under Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty the agreement must also have an 
"appreciable effecr on competition and on interstate trade; for details, see below at D. 
13. Fiona Murray and Jacquelyn Maclennan, "The Future for Selective Distribution Systems: The CFI Judgments on Luxury Perfume 
and the Commission Green Paper on Vertical Restraints", European Competition Law Review, Volume 18 Issue 4, June 1997 at 
232. 
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clauses cannot be assessed in abstract 
terms, 14 but depends on the economic con, 
ditions in the relevant market.15 
In addition to this, the case law of 
the Community courts shows an implied ten, 
dency to adopt the American antitrust con, 
cept of a "rule of reason". The supreme 
goal of the competition rules is undistorted 
competition in the internal market (Article 
3 lit. g of the EC Treaty; for the concept of 
the internal market see Article 7a (2) of 
the EC Treaty), i.e. public trade barriers 
within the European Community which by 
and by have been abolished must be pre, 
vented from being replaced by arrange, 
ments between private parties. Thus; as an 
example, the "rule of reason" approach may 
exclude the application of Article 85 (1) 
where, based on market analysis, restric, 
tions to competition do not directly impede 
trade between Member States or where, on 
balance, the arrangement can be seen as 
pro,competitive overall.16 Three examples 
can be given: 
Firstly, the EC] ruled in Delimitis 
that Article 85 ( 1) slwuld not be applied to 
all contractual restrictions of competition; 
rather the impact of said restrictions should 
be evaluated under Article 85 ( 1) and not 
Article 85(3). 17 
Secondly, the EC] has identified cer, 
tain restrictions that fall outside of Article 
103 
85 ( 1) because they are necessary for the 
performance of a particular type of trans, 
action ("ancillary restrictions"). Thus, in 
Case C,250!92 Gottrup,Klim v Dansk 
Landbrugs Grovvareselskab Amba18, the 
Court of Justice held that the rules of a 
Danish agricultural cooperative purchasing 
organisation that prevented members from 
joining competing co, operatives, may have 
an adverse effect on competition. However, 
the Court further said that this will not con, 
stitute a violation of Article 85 ( 1) if the 
prohibition goes no further than is necessary 
to ensure that the co,operative functions 
properly and maintains its purchasing power 
in relation to producers. 
Thirdly, the EC] has in some verti, 
cal agreements cases held a rule of reason 
that in order to induce a licensee or distribu: 
tor to enter the market, some encourage, 
ment in the form of territorial protection is 
needed and thus not prohibited under Arti, 
cle 85(1). 19 
B. Procedural Rights; Access to 
the Commission's Files 
Clearly, access to the Commission's 
file, i.e. sufficient knowledge about the sub, 
ject matter of the Commission's adminis, 
trative procedures, is necessary to enable 
the parties concerned (e.g. the addressees 
of a statement of objections under Article 
2 (1) of Regulation 991 63 on the Hearings 
provided for in Article 19 (1) and 19 (2) of 
14. See for example, infra. Langnese v. Commission, Doctrine of complex economic evaluation. 
15. Case C-250/92 Gottrup Klim, judgment of 15 December 1994. 
16. R. Whish, Competiffon Law, Butterworths, 3rd edn, 1993, at 205-10. 
17. Supra footnote 5 Delimitis. 
18. [1994] ECR 1-5641 but see also the restrictive jurisprudence by Advocate General Lenz in Case C-415193 Bosman [1995] ECR 1-
4921 at points 266 to 269 of his opinion. 
19. See Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm; Case 258/78 Nungesser v. Commission (1982) ECR 2015; 
Case 2621/81 Coditel v. Cine-Vag Films (1982) ECR 3381/81. 
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Regulation 1720) to fully exercise their right 
to be heard and to defend themselves prop--
erly. In this respect, Community procedural 
law seems to be far away form reaching the 
point of development of national procedural 
law. However, there are positive develop--
ments in the jurisprudence. In the Soda--
ash cases of Solvay and ICI, 21 the CFI ruled 
in essence that the principle of "equality of 
arms" required that the undertakings 
against whom a Commission investigation 
is directed must have knowledge of the file 
that is equal to that of the Commission. In 
consequence of these judgments, the Com--
mission decided to simplify its procedures 
concerning access to the file. It adopted a 
Notice on the Internal Rules of Procedure 
for Processing Requests for Access to the 
File in Cases Pursuant to Article 85 and 86 
of the EC Treaty, Articles 65 and 66 of the 
ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation No. 
4064!89.22 
The Notice deals primarily with the 
scope and limits of access to the file and 
the practical procedures for access. It 
should be noted, however, that the inter--
nal rules of procedure relate only to the 
rights of firms being investigated for a pos--
sible violation and not to the rights of third 
parties and complainants. The firms in ques--
tion have access to essentially all documents 
except those containing business or profes--
sional secrets of other undertakings, inter--
nal Commission documents and other 
20. OJ 1963, 2268. 
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confidential information. 23 Ordinarily, the 
firms are requested to examine the accessi--
ble documents on Commission premises. If 
the file is not too large, the firm may have 
the option of receiving it via post. Access 
to ongoing files compiled prior to the adop--
tion of the new rules will be decided on a 
case by case basis. 
The above explanations about access 
to the Commission's file are only a brief sum--
mary of one of the most controversial and 
complex issues of European antitrust law. 
· In practice, legal generalists often naively 
request "access to the Commission's file as 
a whole" because they are not aware of the 
very diversified jurisprudence on this issue. 
These generalists normally are badly sur--
prised by getting meaningless summaries of 
papers in the Commissions files or nothing 
at all. In this thorny area more than in any 
other area of European antitrust law, com--
panies should retain specialist advice to be 
successful. 
1. Third Party Rights 
Defending one's procedural rights in 
formal administrative proceedings before 
the Commission becomes even more diffi--
cult when one is a third party, i.e. not in--
volved in an adversarial proceeding. Third 
parties with an interest in the Commission's 
procedure typically will be competitors to 
parties notifying a merger or another com--
21. Decided in parallel: Cases T-30/91 Solvay v. Commission [1995] ECR 11-1775; Case T-36/91 ICI v. Commission (1995] ECR 11-
1847; Case T-371911CI v. Commission (1995] ECR 11-1901. 
22. OJ C 23, 23 January 1997. 
23. See Article 214 of the EC Treaty, Article 20 of Regulation 17 (basic code of procedure in European antitrust matters), OJ 1962, 
131/204 and OJ 1959-62, 87; Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals v. Commission (1991] ECR 11-1711. 
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petition--sensitive arrangement, or competi--
tors of parties seeking approval of state aid 
by the Commission.24 As a rule, third party 
rights to be heard are less developed than 
in most Member States. 25 
In European Community Law the 
right to be heard is in principle established 
in all proceedings initiated against a person 
which could result in a measure adversely 
affecting that person. This fundamental 
principle is guaranteed even in the absence 
of written law. 26 Carrying the right to be 
heard one step further, the ECJ in the Brit--
ish American Tobacco--R.]. Reynolds27 and 
Lisrestal cases recognized the right of inter--
ested third parties, not just respondents·,. to 
be heard prior to the adoption of a decision 
capable of adversely affecting them. 28 This 
is tempered with the fact that third parties' 
procedural rights are not as far reaching as 
the right to a fair hearing of the companies 
which are the object of the Commission's 
investigation, and the limits of such rights 
are reached when third parties begin to in--
terfere with those companies' rights to a fair 
hearing. 
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If a third party wishes to exercise its 
right to be heard, it must be directly con--
cerned with the matter in question. 29 
Concerning state aid clearance un--
der the preliminary procedure under Arti--
cle 93 (3) of the EC Treaty, the CFI stated 
in a dictum: Where the Commission intends 
taking a measure adversely affecting a third 
party, but the Commission does not hear 
that third party in respect to information 
on which the measure is to be based, then 
the Com~ission is under an obligation to 
examine ex officio the objections which the 
third party would certainly have raised had 
it been heard. 30 It is submitted that this 
dictum may lend itself to general applica--
tion in the whole of European competition 
law. Third parties should be advised that if 
they wish to exercise their right to be heard 
in an efficient way they should cooperate 
with the Commission, e.g. by voluntarily 
providing information requested by the 
Commission. For example, in Pleuger 
Worthington, another state aid case, the ECJ 
held that should the Commission by way of 
a decision request information and it is not 
24. This latter category of cases cannot be further examined at this stage. But see Schohe, Rivals in a state, Airline Business August 
1996, p. 42 et seq. 
25. Infra. See generally Case 142/84 and 156/84 British American Tobacco Company L'td and R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. v. Com-
mission [1987] ECR 4487. Also see Sinochem case in Anti-Circumvention Rules section. 
26. Case C-135/92, Fiskano v. Commission, [1994] ECR 1-2885; Case C-32195 P Commission v Lisretal and others [1996] ECR 1-
5373, point 21; Case C-301/87 France v Commission [1990] ECR 1-307, point 29; Joined Cases C 48/90 and C 66/90, Nether-
lands and others v. Commission, [1992] ECR 1-565, point 44. 
27. Case 142184 and 156/84 British American Tobacco Company Ltd and R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. v. Commission [1987] ECR 
4487. Complainants must be given the opportunity to defend their legitimate interests during the administrative proceedings and 
the Commission must consider all the matters of fact and of law that they bring to its attention. 
28. Case C-32195P Commission v. Lisrestal[1996] ECR 15373. 
29. See, Lisresta~ id. at points 22 et seq. 
30. Case T-95/94, Sytraval v. Commission: [1995] ECR 11-2651 point 66; see for this case: Gerrit Schohe/Mark Hoenike, supra note 3, 
p. 742; Bernhard Schloh/Mark Hoenike, Die Anforderungsfrist bei der Konkurrentenklage im Beihilfenrecht nach Art. 173 EGV, 
EuzW Europaische Zeitschrift tor Wirtschaftsrecht 1997, p. 398 et seq. 
Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFRGS, v. 15, 1998 
106 
provided with it, the Commission is not 
obliged to seek it elsewhere, but may pro, 
ceed upon the facts available.31 
It is obvious that third parties must 
be sufficiently informed about the subject 
matter of the proceedings in advance so that 
they can exercise their right to be heard in 
an efficient way. This intersects with the 
aforementioned problem of access to the 
Commission's file. Unfortunately, this ba, 
sic right seems to be at an "embryonic stage" 
in Community law. The strongest author, 
ity that we can find in support of advance 
information of third parties is the opinion 
of Advocate General Warner in Case 113/ 
7 7 NTN Toyo Bearing Company v. Council 
("ballbearings"). He said:32 
"It is a fundamental principle of 
Community law that, before any individual 
measure is taken, of such nature as directly 
to affect the interests of a particular person, 
that person has a right to be heard by the 
responsible authority; and it is part and par, 
eel of that principle that, in order to enable 
him effectively to exercise that right, the per, 
son concerned is entitled to be informed of 
the facts and considerations on the basis of 
which the authority is minded to act. That 
principle . . . applies regardless of whether 
there is a specific legislative text requiring its 
application. " 
Similarly, in Al ]ubail, the ECJ de .. 
clared an anti.-dumping regulation to be 
void on the basis that the Community in, 
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stitutions had failed to provide the plain.-
tiffs with the necessary information in or, 
der for them to exercise their procedural 
rights in an adequate manner. 33 There is no 
legal reason to treat third parties in anti, 
trust cases differel)tly from parties in anti.-
dumping cases like in Al ]ubail. 
Again, however, it should be noted 
that European Community law, on the one 
hand and European Community daily prac .. 
tice, on the other, may substantially differ. 
Despite legal arguments, in practice third 
parties are faced with the difficulty of ob .. 
taining a hearing and, as a prerequisite for 
such a hearing, sufficient information on the 
subject matter of the Commission proce.-
dure. Thus, for example, in KSB I Goulds I 
Lowara I ITT 34, third parties opposed an 
exemption under Article 85 (3) from the 
ban on competition.-restricting practices. In 
that attempt, the Commission was re .. 
quested to send them copies of the briefs 
submitted by the applicants for the exemp.-
tion, with business secrets to be deleted. All 
they received were copies of a few selected 
briefs; in addition, the Commission had 
deleted so many parts of these briefs that 
no meaningful response was possible. 
Another third party problem is posed 
by the informal hearings between the Com.-
mission and the parties to a competition .. 
sensitive arrangement. Such information 
hearings, as a matter of practice, most of .. 
31. Joined Cases C-324/90 and C-342190 Federal Republic of Germany and Pleuger Worthington GmbH v. Commission [1994] ECR 
1-1173, points 27 and 28. 
32. [1979] ECR 1185 at 1261. 
33. Case 49/88 AI Jubail Fertilizer v. Council [1991] 1-3187, point 18. 
34. Commission Decision of December 12, 1990 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the Treaty in Case NO IV. 32.363- KSB 
I Goulds I Lowara I /IT, OJ L 19 I 25. 
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ten take place prior to formal proceedings 
before the Commission. During the infor .. 
mal stage, the Commission will bend over 
backwards to ensure that it gets as wide an 
input as possible from third parties. How.-
ever, it adamantly refuses third parties, at 
this stage, access to any of the information 
collected from other sources. This is a very 
serious shortcoming if one considers that 
the Commission often forms a preliminary 
opinion on the case already on the basis of 
the informal talks. 
In addition, two recent develop.-
ments regarding access to information 
should be briefly noted: 
', 
Firstly, on the basis of Comm'unity 
legislation ("secondary Community Law"), 
the Community courts have begun devel .. 
oping a general right of information for eve, 
ryone as regards internal documents of the 
Communit-y institutions (for example pre .. 
paratory p~pers for closed,door legislation 
by the Council). In a nutshell, under this 
recent jurisprudence, the institution con, 
cemed has to weigh, on a case,by,case ba, 
sis, its interests in confidentiality against the 
private person's interest in obtaining the in, 
formation sought. 35 
Secondly, pursuant to the recent 
Post bank judgment36, national courts, based 
on the duty of sincere cooperation enshrined 
in Article 5 of the Treaty, may ask the Com, 
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mission for information about competition 
cases pending before the latter. Parties may 
use this as a possibility of indirectly obtain, 
ing information from the Commission. Ar .. 
ticle 2 0 of Regulation 17 (the Basic Antitrust 
Procedural Code), which normally protects 
business secrets against disclosure, is not 
applicable in this instance. Subject to nec .. 
essary precautions to be taken by the Com .. 
mission, it is for the national courts to protect 
the rights of defence of the enterprises con, 
cemed and their business secrets and other 
confidential information. 37 
In any case, third parties regularly 
should be advised to exercise their rights in 
the administrative procedure before the 
Commission to the fullest. First, such pro.-
cedural engagement may help them to es.-
tablish standing pursuant to Article 1 7 3 (5) 
of the Treaty, if they should wish to chal .. 
lenge the ensuing Commission decision 
before the Community courts. Second, in.-
formal talks with European judges have 
made it clear that judges do not consider 
their court procedure to be a repetition of 
the Commission procedure. Therefore, 
even if there is no rule to this effect, a par.-
ty's influence before the Community courts 
appreciates substantially if the plaintiff has 
vigorously defended its interests before the 
Commission and exhausted each legal rem.-
edy available before that institution. 38 
35. See Judgment of March 5, 1997, Case T-105/95, WWF v. Commission, not yet officially published; Case T-194/94, Carvel a~d 
Guardian Newspapers Ltd. v. Council, [1995] ECR 11-2767; Case C-58/94 Netherlands v. Commission [1996] ECR 1-2186, pomt 
34. 
36. Case T-353/94 Postbank v. Commission [1996] ECR, 11-923; see further Joined Cases C-319/93, C-40/94 and C-2~4/~4 Dijk~tra 
and others[1995] ECR, 1-4471, point 34 and Case C-234/89 De/imitis[1991] ECR 1-935, point 53. See also Comm1ss1on Not1ce 
between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, OJ 1993 C 39/6. 
37. See Postbank, id. at points 72 and 73 and 90. 
38. See, for relatively recent example, Case T-161/94 Sinochem Heilongjiang v. Council, [1996] ECR 1-695, points 4 7 to 49 (standing 
on account of active participation). 
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2. Giving Evidence Against 
Accomplices ("King's 
Evidence") and the 
Commission's New Leniency 
On July 10, 1996., the European 
Commission adopted a Notice on the non, 
imposition or reduction of fines in cartel 
cases.39 It applies to hard core infringements 
of the antitrust rules such as price,fixing, 
fixation of sales or production quotas, mar, 
ket sharing, ("chacun chez soi'') or import or 
export bans; By reducing or waiving the 
fine which normally would have imposed, 
the Commission hopes to provide ample 
incentive to break down the barriers of se, 
crecy surrounding cartels and encourage 
firms from engaging in anti,competitive 
practices to supply evidence. It should be 
recalled that antitrust fines can reach up to 
10% of an undertakings yearly turnover. 40 
While new, the notice conforms to the 
Commission's established practice of tak, 
ing cooperation into account. The Case 
Cartonboard41 illustrates that prompt and 
effective remedial action and co,operation 
with the Commission may result in substan, 
tial mitigation of the fine. A 66% reduc, 
tion in fines was given to an undertaking, 
Gerhard Laule 
which handed over documents and to a 
leader in the cartel who provided details 
regarding various committees. A 33% re, 
duction was granted to those firms who did 
not contest the factual allegations. 
Most recently, in the infamous Lysine 
case, there was an instance of whistle blow, 
ing (cooperation between one of the design, 
ers of a price,fixing arrangement and US 
investigation services) in a situation involv, 
ing alleged price fixing by a US subsidiary 
of a globally active Japanese firm that re, 
suited in all but three defendants settling 
and in record breaking fines of $100 mil, 
lion. Attractive as the Commission's leni, 
ency policy may be, this policy is 
nevertheless a delicate one. Where an un, 
dertaking wishes to take advantage of the 
Notice, it should retain specialist advice 
rather than speak with Commission 
unpreparedly. 
In addition to fixing, the Lysine case 
alerted also the other side of the Atlantic, 
i.e. the Commission. This raised the issue 
of extraterritorial application of European 
antitrust law which is dealt with in the next 
section. 
39. OJ C 207, July 18, 1996. This notice is closely modeled on the .Corporate Leniency Policy" issued by the US Department of 
Justice in August 1993. 
40. See Article 15 of Regulation 17. 
41. Cases T-308/94 Cascades SA and others v. Commission, C-64/94R Descow Scales v Council[1994] -1-867 (a.k.a. the Carton board 
decisions) [1995] ECR 11-265; see in particular the treatment of Stora in Cartonboard, [1994] 5 CMLR 547 ("very substantial 
reduction in the fine" for spontaneous admission and provision of detailed evidence that assisted the investigation:§ 171); OJ 
1994 L 243/1 [1994] 5 CMLR 547, on appeal Cases T-295/94, etc. see also, Case T-156/94R Aristrain v. Commission [1994] II 
ECR 717 (partial suspension of the fine) (pending); see generally, concerning agreements on selling prices and conditions: Joined 
Cases T-134/94, T-136/94, T-137/94, T-138/94, T-141/94, T-145/94, T-147/94, T-148/94, T-151/94, T-156/94 and T-157/94 NMH 
Stahlwerke GmbH and Others v. Commission (a.k.a.Steel beams decisions) [1996] ECR 11-0537; OJ 1994 L 116/1 [1994] 5 CMLR 
353 on appeal Cases T-137/94, etc. (pending) and Joined Cases T-10/92, T-11/92, T-12192 and T-15/92 Cimenteries CBR SA 
and Others v. Commission (a.k.a. the Cement decisions) [1992] ECR 11-2667 OJ 1994 L 34311 [1995] 4 VMLT 327, on appeal 
Cases T-25/95, etc. (pending). 
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c. Extraterritorial Application of 
EC-Competition Law: The 
ECJ's territoriality principle v. 
the Commission's effects 
doctrine 
With the global opening of markets 
("globalization") especially under the aus, 
pices of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) anti,competitive actions in one 
market may now affect other markets in 
other regions of the world. More than any 
other development, globalization has raised 
the issue of whose market's antitrust author, 
ity should have jurisdiction over the case. 
Should there be concurring jurisdictions 
with the risk of diverging opinions? Or, in 
the alternative, should "positive comity" be 
given, so that one antitrust authority may 
defer to the opinion of another antitrust 
authority, for example on the grounds that 
the latter is better situated to investigate 
the case or that the impact of the case on 
the latter authority's market is greater? 
Where no "positive comity" is given, can 
trade wars or diplomatic conflicts over di, 
verging antitrust opinions be avoided on the 
basis of bilateral or multilateral agreements 
or within the framework of such interna, 
tional dispute settlement bodies as provided 
for by the WTO? These issues are so im, 
portant that the WTO during its 1996 Sin, 
gapore conference established a working 
group on cooperation in competition mat, 
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ters with a report due out in 1998. The cur, 
rent European viewpoint on these issues is 
as follows: 
In Woodp1:-1-lP II42 the ECJ decided that 
the place where the competition,restrictive 
agreement was to be implemented was de, 
cisive for the jurisdiction of the EU institu, 
tions. The Court also said that the 
Community could apply European Commu, 
nity competition rules to undertakings out, 
side the European Community under the 
principle pf territoriality, a universally recog, 
nized principle in public internationallaw.43 
On the other hand, the Commission 
relies on the effects doctrine when applying 
antitrust law to undertakings outside of the 
EU. In Woodpulp, 44 the Commission as, 
serted that the Community had jurisdiction 
over undertakings which implement a con, 
certed practice that directly, intentionally 
and appreciably affects competition within 
the Community and trade between its 
members. It was sufficient that the under, 
takings either imported into or used agents 
or sales offices within the EU. 
The Commission reiterated this line 
of reasoning in Gencor/Lonrho. 45 Gencor 
Ltd. of South Africa and Lonrho plc of the 
United Kingdom intended to acquire joint 
control of Impala Platinum Holdings Lim, 
ited, a South African platinum mining and 
refinery company. The Commission de, 
42. Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85 Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and Others v. Commission ECR (1988) 5223, 5246; 
the Commission decision in the matter is universally cited as "Woodpullf, while the judgment is known as "Woodpulp /r. 
43. See, e.g. Alfred Verdross and Bruno Simma, Universelles VOikerrecht- Theorie und Praxis, § 1166. 
44. Commission decision of 19 December 1984 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty Case No. IV/29/.725-
Woodpulp, OJ L 85/1, March 26 1985. 
45. Commission decision of 24 April1996 declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the Common Market and the functioning 
of the EEAAgreement, Case No.IV/M.619- Gencor!Lonrho, OJ L 11/30, 14.01.1997. 
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dared the transaction incompatible with 
the common market based on the determi.-
nation that the operation would create a 
medium term dominant position in the 
platinum market reducing competition on 
the worldwide platinum market. The Com.-
mission did not deem it important that 
Impala Platinum Holdings Limited was situ.-
ated outside the EU and that the Commu.-
nity market obtained most of its platinum 
from Russia. Rather, the Commission held 
that the platinum market was a world mar.-
ket with prices set at the world market level. 
Thus, anti.-competitive effects of this op.-
eration such as higher prices on all plati.-
num sold in the world would be felt inside 
the EU.46 
Clearly, the effects doctrine of the 
Commission is much wider in scope than 
the territoriality principle used by the Court. 
In contrast to the territoriality principle, the 
effects doctrine is not a universally accepted 
principle of public international law. Con.-
sequently, with its effect doctrine as a base, 
the Commission could face problems un.-
der international law when applying Euro.-
pean antirust law to enterprises or conduct 
outside of its accepted realm of jurisdiction. 
This difficulty has not deterred the Com.-
mission, as illustrated in by one of the most 
prominent cases of this year: the recent and 
46. Ibid. at paragraph 206. 
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dramatic intervention by the European 
Commission in the US Boeing,McDonnell 
Douglas merger.47 It is astonishing that in 
its 33 page decision concerning the Boeing 
McDonnelDouglas merger48, the Commis.-
sion did not say a single word about its as.-
sumption of jurisdiction over the case. The 
question arises whether this blatant omis.-
sion was due to oversight, lack of arguments, 
or simply political arrogance. 
The merger between Boeing and 
McDqnnell Douglas took the cooperation 
agreement between the EC and the US 
competition authorities49 to its limits. The 
situation turned into a fierce conflict be .. 
tween the European Commission and the 
US resulting in middle of the night phone 
calls from US President Clinton to heads 
of state. For obvious reasons, the US did 
not appreciate the European Commission 
assuming jurisdiction in its affairs and still 
bears a grudge. In addition, as the merger 
was not a day to day matter, the college of 
all Commissioners and not Competition 
Commissioner van Miert had to decide. 
. However, according to one of the French 
Commissioners in an interview, the Com.-
missioners were given the necessary infor.-
mation so late that they could not study 
the files before the decision was taken. 
While the Commission will assert that it 
47. On merger-preventing strategies see generally, Tefft W. Smith and Hillard M. Sterling, Challenging Competitors' Mergers: A Real 
Strategic Option, Antitrust Law Journal vol. 65 [1996]. The threat of litigation is addressed as a real and potentially powerful 
strategic option to disrupt a rival's proposed acquisition or merger regardless of the government's decision to mount a challenge or 
not. 
48. This far, the Commission decision on the Boeing I McDonneiDoug/as merger has not yet been published. 
49. Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities regard-
ing the application of their competition laws. OJ Nr. L 95/45, 27.04.1995. See Commission Report to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their competition law. KOM(96) 479. 
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decided without succumbing to political 
pressure, the market place perception is that 
it held out until the last moment for a con.-
cession from Boeing to save face. As one 
director in the Commission put it: "No 
agreement can deal with the situation 
where people come to different conclusions 
on the same facts. We are entitled to our 
view and they are entitled to theirs. "50 In 
light of statements such as these, one is in.-
cluded to wonder whether the European 
Commission, beyond the Boeing case, 
wanted to stake a power claim among the 
world's big trading blocks. 51 
It has also been reported that the 
European Commission was threateilil)g 
KLM and its US partner Northwest with 
daily fines if they continued to refuse to 
provide further details concerning their al .. 
liance. One can only question whether or 
not the European Commission is entitled, 
under public international law, to fine 
Northwest. 52 
The Boeing case was not an isolated 
incident, but only reflects a problem that 
arises over and over in daily practice. Two 
examples of my current cases will under.-
line this. One of them involves an exclu .. 
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sive purchasing agreement between a J apa.-
nese and US firm. The agreement explic.-
itly states that it does not apply to the 
European Community. Nonetheless, the 
Commission is likely to use its effects doc, 
trine claims jurisdiction as European sales 
will suffer as a consequence of the afore.-
mentioned agreement. Another of our re.-
cent cases involved the question of whether 
the Commission could impose fines on a 
related but separate firm here in Europe 
based on the findings of the investigation 
in the US concerning a US firm's alleged 
price fixing scheme. These are thought .. pro.-
voking examples of the breadth of the ef .. 
fects doctrine and in contrast, the 
restrictiveness of the Court's territoriality 
principle which would not have lent legal 
support to the Commission's objective. 
Under these circumstances bilateral 
agreements, like the US.-EC agreement on 
competition matters, are becoming more 
and more important. The Agreement is 
aimed at preventing conflicts in the en.-
forcement of the European and US com.-
petition laws.53 54 Terms have been laid out 
for detailed consultation on cases and is.-
sues of common interest. Each party agrees 
50. Jonathan Faull, quoted in (1997) European Counsel, Vol. II N2 8, p. 15. 
51. For a US-American view expressing understanding of the Commission's assumption of concurrent ju~sdiction in the Bo_eing ca~~· 
see Joel J. Klein, in his address of October 16, 1997 to the Fordham Annual Conference on International Law and Polley ~Ant1et· 
pating the Millenium: International Antitrust Enforcement at the End of the Twentieth .Century), at p. 10 et seq (not yet published). 
52. Het Financieele Dagblad (Dutch Newspaper) of January 16, 1997. 
53. It provides for: 
firstly, notification of enforcement activities which may affect important interests of the other party; secondly, an exchange ?f 
information on general matters relating to the application of the parties' competition laws, thirdly, the duty to take account In 
enforcement activities of the other party's important interests, and, fourthly, a positive comity procedure under which either party 
may request the other party to initiate appropriate enforcement activities in respect of anti-competitive activities occurring within 
the latter's territory and affecting the former's important interests. 
54. Jean-Yves Art and Dirk Van Liedekeerke, Developments in EC Competition Law in 1995: an Overview, CML Rev. Vol. 33, No.4 
August 1996 at 773-74. 
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to notify the other of matters that may im~ 
plicate the other's antitrust laws. Provisions 
governing the transfer of confidential in~ 
formation are also included.55 The main 
practical issue remains that unless the par~ 
ties are willing to waive confidentiality pro~ 
visions and to cooperate in a joint 
investigation, confidentiality laws limit the 
amount of information that can be ex~ 
changed. Communication of confidential 
information by the Commission seems to 
be a practical impossibility as Article 214 
of the EC Treaty prevents the Commission 
from doing so. 56 Though judged a success, 
this Agreement is a rather toothless tiger. 57 
There now is a proposed EC~US 
Agreement on the application of positive 
comity principles in the enforcement of 
competition law. As of yet, there is no un~ 
derstanding on how to solve conflicts of 
jurisdiction between the US and the Euro~ 
pean Community in a competition matter. 
Likewise, there is no arrangement concern~ 
ing which of the parties has the final say 
should there be a disagreement. Similarly, 
there is no reference made to which arbi~ 
trating body (i.e. the International Court 
in the Hague or the WTO), if any, is. to set~ 
tle disagreements. All of this may change, 
as the US authorities are threatening to take 
the Boeing case to the WTO. 
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It should be added that the US De~ 
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission issued updated ''Antitrust En~ 
forcement Guidelines for International 
Operation. "58 These explain that in appro~ 
priate cases, US agel)cies may take enforce~ 
ment action against anti~competitive 
conduct that restrains US exports wherever 
it occurs. 59 This jurisdiction is based on uni~ 
lateral action by the US agencies and a nar~ 
row definition of international comity. Just 
like the Commission's unilateral interfer~ 
ence in the Boeing~ McDonnell Douglas 
merger, the US guidelines are a tool for trade 
policy. They are highly controversial. The 
preceding comments concentrated on the 
US and Europe. However, as the Lysine case 
makes clear, the Japanese industry may eas~ 
ily become entangled in international anti~ 
trust conflicts. With that in mind, it seems 
alarming that between trading blocks as 
large as Japan and the Community, there is 
no bilateral legal framework for the resolu~ 
tion of potential jurisdictional conflicts in 
antitrust matters. 
D. Appreciable effect 
The doctrine of" appreciable effect" 
is an additional means to narrow the overly 
broad wording of Article 85 (1) of the EC 
Treaty. It is one of four means whereby an 
55. Ronan Harty and Joel Cohen, From Notification to Approval: USA European Council October 1997 at 128. 
56. Reported by John Ratliff, Major Events in EC Competition Law, IBC Conference November 1995. The obligations on confidenti-
ality are found in Regulation 17/62. 
57. lvo Van Bael & Jean-Francois Bellis, commission's second report on the application of the EC-US Agreement shows it to be a 
qualified success, EC Competition Law Reporter, Issue 5, 1997. 
58. John Ratliff, Major Events in EC Competition Law, IBC Conference November 1995. 
59. Appropriate cases may consist of, firstly, conduct having a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on exports of 
goods or services from the United States, or, secondly, the US courts obtaining jurisdiction over persons or corporations engaged 
in such conduct. 
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agreement can escape the ambit of Article 
85 ( 1). The other means are: 
Firstly, certain types of restrictions 
in common trading arrangements are either 
beneficial or at least not seriously anti~ com~ 
petitive. For such arrangements, the Com~ 
mission has enacted a series of block 
exemptions under Article 85 (3) of the 
Treaty. 60 Unfortunately, many of these block 
exemptions are rigid and far from business 
reality. 61 
Secondly, agreements may fall 
within Article 85 ( 1), but not within one of 
the block exemptions. Such agreements are 
unenforceable pursuant to Article 85 (2) 
rules specifically exempted by the Commis, 
sian under Article 85 (3). 
Thirdly, as already explained earlier, 
the Commission courts have shown a 
tendancy towards a "rule of reason" to limit 
the scope of Article 85 ( 1). The fact and 
economic circumstances of each individual 
case must be assessed. The courts will tol, 
erate less and less speculations by the Com, 
mission about the market; the market must 
be analyzed. 62 
The basic rule of the doctrine of ap, 
preciable effect, though unwritten, is that 
the agreement which would otherwise fall 
within Article 85 (1) nonetheless falls out~ 
side the prohibition where it is unlikely to 
affect trade between Member States or to 
restrict competition to any appreciable extent. 
This follows from the limited power princi~ 
ple mentioned above in conjunction with 
113 
the doctrine of proportionality (see Article 
36 of the Treaty). 
The doctrine of appreciable effect is 
applied as follows: First, one must examine 
if the object of the agreement is to restrict, 
distort or prevent competition. Second, if 
the object of the agreement is not suffi, 
ciently detrimental to competition, the 
question is whether it has an appreciable 
effect on competition? To assess 
appreciability in regards to an exclusive dis, 
tribution_contract, one should consider the 
following factors: The nature of the prod, 
ucts, the quantity to be sold under the 
agreement, the market position of supplier 
and reseller, whether the agreement is 
"stand alone" or part of a network, these~ 
verity of the clauses and whether parallel 
trade is permitted. 
These guidelines necessitate defin~ 
ing the market. It is not likely that non~ 
price vertical restraints will have an 
anti,competitive object; thus, they will need 
to be assessed to establish their effect. Fre, 
quently, individual agreements will not have 
an appreciable effect on competition in and 
of themselves. These agreements therefore 
need to be assessed in the context of the 
network effe,ct of similar agreements in the 
market. 
In ass~ssing "appreciability", account 
must also be taken of whether the arrange, 
ment under consideration belongs to a bun, 
60. See e.g. Luc Gyselen, supra note 3, p. 367 et seq. for block exemptions in the field of insurance. 
61. Marc van der Woude, supra. Note 3. Also, note that the Commission is trying to move towards a more market oriented approach 
with its Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, infra. · 
62. See Delimitis above; see also Case 5/69 Volk v. Verwaecke [1969] 295, 302; a similarly rigorous trend exists in the areas of state 
aid; see, in particular, the very stringent ECR decision in Joined Cases C-329/93, C-62/93, C-63/95 Germany and others v. 
Commission (Bremer Vulkan) [1996] ECR 1-5151, points 23, 31 and 52. 
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dle of similar arrangements. In Delimitis63 , 
the ECJ held that, while an individual 
agreement may not on its own appear to 
appreciably restrict competition, it must be 
examined in the context of the market in 
question64 • It is the ease or difficulty of en~ 
try into the market by competitors, and the 
effect of said agreement on such entry, 
which determines whether the agreement 
has an appreciable effect. 65 
This theme has also been taken up 
in the Commission's Green Paper on Verti~ 
cal Restraints. 66 
The Commission's Notice on Agree~ 
ments of Minor Importance which do not 
fall within Article 8567 attempts to quantify 
63. Case C-234/89 Delimitis (1991) I ECR 935 (1992) 5 CMLR 210. 
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the appreciability threshold, thus giving the 
term "appreciability" certainty. 68 Certainty 
is to be achieved by introducing clear defi~ 
nitions: the relevant market, 69 the market 
shares and the turnovers of the enterprises 
concerned. The undertakings can use this 
themselves as a guidance to determine 
whether or not their agreements fall within 
the scope of Article 85(1) by virtue of their 
minor importance. 70 
On October 8, 1997, the Commis~ 
sion adopted new provisions clarifying and 
broadening the definition of agreements of 
"minor importance". The turnover thresh~ 
old which restricted the minor importance 
exemption to small and medium~sized un~ 
dertakings (SMEs) 71 has been abolished, 
64. For example, is the market concentrated, competitive or declining? 
65. The Court's two-pronged test was: 
Firstly, "if an examination of all similar contracts entered into on the relevant market and the other factors relevant to the economic 
and legal context in which the contract must be examined shows that those agreements do not have the cumulative effect of 
denying access to that market to new national and foreign competitors, the individual agreements comprising the bundle of 
agreements cannot be held to restrict competition within the meaning of Article 85(1). They do not, therefore, fall under the 
prohibition laid down in that provision. 
Secondly, if, on the other hand, such examination reveals that it is difficult to gain access to the relevant market, it is necessary to 
assess the extent to which the agreements entered into by the brewery in question contribute to the cumulative effect produced in 
that respect by the totality of the similar contracts found on that market. Under the Community rules on competition, responsibility 
for such an effect of closing off the market must be attributed to the breweries that make an appreciable contribution thereto. Beer 
supply agreements entered into by breweries whose contribution to the cumulative effect is insignificant do not therefore fall under 
the prohibition under Article 85(1)." 
It is established that the Delimitis decision extends to all exclusive purchasing agreements. See Case C-393/92 Almelo (1994) I 
ECR 1477. Also see, Yves Saint Laurent Parfums, OJ 1992 L 12/24, 31 (1993) 4 CMLR 120. 
66. This analysis, titled "Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy" (hereinafter "Green Paper"), was published 
January 22, 1997 and is available on the DGIV website. 
67. OJ 1986 C 231/2, amended in OJ 1994 C 368/20 and, lastly in OJ 1997 C 29/3. The Notice is for guidance only and is not binding 
on Community courts. 
68. The Notice is based on the well-established Community principle of "appreciability" in the application of Article 85. This principle 
was set out most clearly in the case of Beguelin where it was stated: "in order to come within the prohibition imposed by Article 85 
the agreement must affect trade between member States and the free play of the competition to an appreciable extent." See case 
22171 Begue lin Import and others v. SAGL Import Export and others [1971] ECR 949. 
69. Infra. Market Definition section. 
70. Ibid. paragraph 3. 
71. To foster a consistent enterprise policy for SMEs a framework has been established to facilitate cooperation between small and 
medium sized undertakings. 1986 Notice, recital1. The Commission acknowledges that SMEs are not generally caught by Article 
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and it is now possible for agreements be~ 
tween large companies to be considered non 
"appreciable" as regards interstate trade and 
competition.72 There was no persuasive le~ 
gal or economic reason for excluding larger 
firms holding modest market shares from 
the scope of the de minimis rule. This means 
a move away from the significance of the 
size of a business and towards a concentra~ 
tion of the economic impact of the agree, 
ment in question on competition. 
The new notice will also distinguish 
between horizontal and vertical agree~ 
ments. The market share threshold in the 
case of horizontal agreements will rem.ain 
at the 5% level. Vertical agreements, which 
are ordinarily less harmful to competition, 
have had their threshold increased to 
10%73, thus making market penetration 
easier. Not to be forgotten is that one needs 
market definition to determine the thresh~ 
old. 
In cases that represent serious restric, 
tions of competition, Article 85 (1) still ap, 
plies and one cannot invoke the principle 
of appreciable effect. This "black list" in~ 
eludes price fixing, production or sales quo, 
tas, and the sharing of markets or supply 
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sources as they artificially re~erect internal 
borders; this would be in conflict with the 
internal market concept (Article 7 a of the 
Treaty). The Commission will in any case 
take action to the extent required by Com, 
munity interest, particularly in cases where 
the proper functions of the single market 
are affected. 
It has been shown that the Commis, 
sion cannot make per se decisions concern, 
ing restriction of competition. It carries the 
burden ofinitially seeking information and 
analyzing the market in respect of "appre, 
ciable effect". 
However, two cautionary points 
should b~ emphasized: 
Firstly, often the Commission goes 
beyond the market as it actually is ("Status 
quo") and tries to forecast future market 
developments, sometimes based on pure 
speculation. While recognizing that as of the 
time being there is no appreciable effect, the 
Commission may nevertheless assume a 
potential effect. 
Secondly, unlike in German law 
(and perhaps other national legal orders), 
the Commission Notice may not even be 
binding on the Commission itself, but is only 
providi-ry.g general guidance. 74 
5 but that the Notice does not properly address their special position in competition terms. SMEs are not completely taken outside 
the scope of Article 85. The Notice can be seen to introduce a two-level test of appreciability: a cut-off for SMEs according to 
objective criteria and an economic assessment according to factors which vary with each case. 
72. Agence Europe No. 7075, 9 October 1997 at 6. 
73. Ibid. 
74. See, e.g. Case T-7/89 Hercules Chemicals I Kommission [1991] ECR 11-1711, point 55; see also Advocate General Reisch/ in 
Case 31/80 L'Oreal v De Nieuwe Amck [1980] ECR 3775 at 3803; Advocat General Tesauro, Case C-381/87 Hoogovens Groep 
v. Commission [1989] ECR 3833 at 3839; question of self-binding effect of Commission communications left unresolved in Case 
T-353/94 Postbank NV v. Kommission id. at points 57 and 76: for an in-depth analysis see Christian Crines "Selbstbindungen der 
Verwaltungen im Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrecht - Eine Analyse der Rechtsprechung von EuGH und EuG zur 
ermessensbeschrankenden Wirkung von Gleichheitssatz und Vertrauensschutzprinzip auf Gemeinschaftebene vor 
rechtsvergleichendem Hintergrund", 151 • ed. Baden-Baden (Nomos) 1997. 
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E. Vertical restraints 
In 1997, the Commission issued a 
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EU 
Competition Policy calling for comments 
and suggestions on improving the regula, 
tory framework for "vertical restraints". The 
term "vertical agreements" describes agree, 
ments between firms that operate at differ, 
ent levels75 in the supply chains that bring 
goods and services to the market, i.e. fran, 
chise and other distribution systems in the 
EU. 76 The Green Paper was prompted 
mainly by the facts that the single market 
legislation is now in place, and the expira, 
tion of the block exemptions for exclusive 
distribution, exclusive purchasing and 
franchising is now impending. 77 The Com, 
mission also noted that a fundamental re, 
thinking of policy was necessary in light of 
the importance of changed market struc, 
ture. 
The Green Paper must be read in the 
context of the EU's fundamental political 
objective: to integrate the countries of the 
EU through interpenetration of the national 
markets. In the pursuit of this objective, 
the relationship between producers and dis, 
tributors, as well as other vertical relation, 
ships, have been of particular to cross border 
market penetration within the Community. 
In the recent landmark decisions in 
Metro,Cartier and Handlerbeirat, the ECJ 
75. I.e .. operating either "upstream" or "downstream" of each other. 
Gerhard LauZe 
recognized that vertical restraints could 
have a positive impact on market penetra, 
tion. 78 In Metro Cartier, the ECJ held that 
the lawfulness of a selective distribution 
system pursuant to Article 85 ( 1) did not 
(and could not) depend on the "impervi, 
ousness" of the system, i.e. a requirement 
developed under German law whereby the 
supplier can contractually prevent author, 
ized dealers from doing business with grey 
market outsiders. The underlying rationale 
of this holding was that parallel imports 
were essential for market integration within 
the Community and therefore, as a require, 
ment of Community law, must be hindered. 
The Court said that: 
" ... to make the validity of a selec, 
tive distribution system under Article 85 ( 1) 
of the Treaty conditional on its "impervious, 
ness" would lead to the paradoxical result 
that the most inflexible and most tightly 
sealed distribution systems would be treated 
more favourably under Article 85 ( 1) of the 
Treaty than distribution systems that are 
more flexible and more open to parallel 
transactions. "79 
The Commission has also recognized 
that vertical restraints can promote effi, 
ciency, assist in penetrating a market and 
foster inter,brand competition,80 Nonethe, 
less, the Commission's current policies re, 
fleet an overriding concern that vertical 
restraints may facilitate the partitioning of 
76. The European Commission's Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy was published on January 22, 1997. 
77. Regulations (EEC) No. 1983/83, 1984/84, and 4260/88. 
78. Case C-376/92 Metro-SB Markte GmbH & Co KG v. Cartier SA [1994] ECR 1-15; Case C-41 /96 VAG Handlerbeirat v. SYD Consult 
[1997] 
79. /d. at point 26. 
80. I.e. Competition between different brands. 
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the Community market on a national basis 
or to exclude new entrants who would add 
to the cornpetition and bring about down, 
ward pressure on prices.81 In summary, ver, 
tical restraints have received greater legal 
scrutiny in the Community than perhaps 
in any other part of the world. 
The Commission has identified four 
types of distribution systems for analytical 
purposes: franchising, exclusive selling, ex, 
elusive buying and selective distribution. 
There are specific block exemption regula, 
tions for the first three types of distribution, 
and a series of Commission decisions and 
guidelines as well as Community court de, 
cisions for selective distribution systems. 
The Commission has developed specific 
policies to help further the positive conse, 
quences of vertical agreements; this is the 
underlying rationale of the block exemp, 
tions.82 The Green Paper recognizes that 
the current block exemption approach may 
not be satisfactory and sets out four alter, 
117 
native proposals for future Community 
policy on vertical restraints: no change from 
the current system, wider block exemptions, 
permitting greater flexibility, 83 more focused 
exemptions that would apply only to firms 
with market share below a certain thresh, 
old and a reduction in the scope of Article 
85 (1), which would give rise to a rebuttable 
presumption of compatibility with Article 
85 (1) for firms with low market shares. 
F. In Particular: The Emergence 
of a Market Foreclosure Test 
The concept of market foreclosure 
encapsulates the Delimitis tests. 84 It de, 
scribes the portion of a market that is closed 
to competition from competitors or new 
entrants, on account of exclusive tying ar, 
rangements with downstream operators. 
Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish ver, 
tical arrangements which are essentially 
harmless in effect from those that must be 
examined under a market foreclosure.85 
81. Agreements often contain restraints which restrict the way in which the parties can buy, sell or resell goods, an example of this 
being exclusive purchasing provisions. 
82. Please note that technology transfer block exemptions, Commission Regulation NO. 240/96, are for this reason more lenient than 
most other exemptions. See in general, Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Agreements and the EC Competition Rules, 
passim. 
83. With the exception of agreements for motor vehicle distribution, the exemption put forward would apply to the agreements be-
tween two or more undertakings that relate to the supply of goods and/or services for resale, incorporation (raw materials or 
ingredients) into a final "product", or consumption; and impose restrictions on the commercial freedom of one or more of the 
parties to the agreement. See European Competition Lawyers' Forum -Vertical Restraints Report to DGIV, September 15, 1997. 
84. Supra footnote 66. 
85. A market foreclosure test can be expressed by a numeric or weighted method. A numeric test consists of calculating the number 
of '1ied" outlets as a percentage of the total number of retail outlets in the relevant market. An alternative is the "weighting"of the 
volume or value of the products sold through the tied outlets and expressing them as a percenatge of the total volume or value of 
sales in the relevant market (''weighting test"). The tests are used in the following analytical framework: The initial step is to 
consider whether the agreement has an appreciable effect on competition in its own right; if it does not, but it is part of a network 
of similar agreements, a numeric or weighted test must be applied to establish whether Article 85( 1) may apply to the agreement, 
given the market foreclosing effect of all other similar agreements in the market (the first Delimitistest); even if the market foreclos-
ure test is not satisfied, the agreement in question has to be reconsidered to establish whether it, either alone or in combination 
with other similar agreements, makes a significant contribution to the identified market foreclosing effect (the second Delimitis 
test): if so, the agreement is caught by Article 85(1). · 
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Economic analysis is essential in assessing 
the effects of agreements, which in turn is 
crucial in deciding when Article 85 (1) will 
apply to particular vertical agreements.86 
The most interesting cases in the af .. 
termath of Delimitis were Langnese and 
Scholler37 which dealt with networks of ex.-
clusive purchasing agreements for impulse 
ice.-cream in Germany. The CFI held that 
Article 85 (1) may be inapplicable even 
where the market share ceiling set out in 
the Commission's Notice88 was exceeded. 
The CFI believed that it was necessary to 
examine the cumulative effect of the agree.-
ments and other similar agreements in their 
economic and legal context, as set out in 
Delimitis, 89 in order to determine whether 
or not competition was affected to a sig .. 
nificant extent. In this particular case, each 
individual agreement might not have had 
a considerable anti.-competitive effect but 
the network of agreements was found to 
have a substantial effect and thus all of the 
agreements were caught by Article 85(1). 
The CFI looked at the numeric and 
volume weighted foreclosure effect of 
Scholler's and Langnese.-Iglo's agreements. 
It stated that both the numeric and the 
volume weighted foreclosure effect of the 
two companies' agreements considered to.-
gether exceeded 30%.90 With respect to 
market factors, the CFI concluded that 
Gerhard Laule 
Langnese.-Iglo's and Scholler's individual 
networks each made a significant contribu .. 
tion to the foreclosure effect on the market 
and that Article 85 (3) could not apply as 
the agreements did not lead to an improve .. 
ment in inter.-brand competition. Accord .. 
ing to the CFI, the agreements were a major 
barrier to access to the market and re .. 
stricted competition within the meaning of 
Article 85 (1). 
The conclusions that can be drawn 
from this jurisprudence are many. The ECJ, 
CFI and Commission have all recognized 
the importance of market foreclosure tests 
in differentiating between situations where 
vertical restraints are acceptable and those 
where they have a harmful affect on com.-
petition. Use of the market foreclose test is 
evolving gradually. Additionally, it has once 
again been shown that in all but the clear .. 
est violations of antitrust law, it is neces.-
sary to conduct a market analysis. 
G. Market Definition 
There is no subject in antitrust more 
confusing than market definition.91 In an 
attempt to clear up some of the confusion, 
the Commission has recently prepared a 
Draft Notice on the Definition of the Rel .. 
evant Market for the Purposes of EC Com .. 
petition Law.92 The Notice is meant to apply 
equally to analysis conducted under Arti.-
86. John Pheasant and Daniel Weston, Vertical Restraints, Foreclosure and Article 85 Developing an Analytical Framework. 
87. Cases T-7/93 Langnese v. Commission [1995) ECR 11-1530 and Case T-9/93 SchOIIerv. Commission [1995] 11-1611. 
88. The Commission's Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance. 
89. Cited above in footnote 3 
90. See points 105 of Case T-7/93 Langnese. 
91. US Healthcare Inc. v. Healthsource Inc. (986 F.2d 589). 
92. Actual Notice expected to be available on October 28, 1997; an early draft version was published in [1997] European Counsel, 
Vol. 2, issue 3, p. 45 et seq.; see further Agence Europe No. 7075 of October 9, 1997, p. 6. 
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des 85 and 86, and to the Merger Regula .. 
tion.93 One unquestionably needs a market 
definition to determine if there is an "ap .. 
preciable effect" within the meaning of Ar .. 
tide 85 (1) or a "dominant position" within 
the meaning of Article 8694 and, if so, to 
determine the market share,95 to see if a 
merger creates or strengthens a market 
dominant position within the meaning of 
Article 2 (3) of the Merger Control Regu .. 
lation, or to verify market share thresholds 
in block exemption regulations. 
Hoping to increase transparency in 
the area of competition law policy and de .. 
cision making, the Commission makes pub .. 
lic the procedures it follows when defining 
markets and the substantive criteria and 
evidence on which it relies when making a 
decision.96 
The standard method of proving 
market power in antitrust cases requires first 
the defining of a relevant market in which 
to calculate the relevant market share.97 
The relevant market within which to as .. 
sess a given competition issue is established 
by the combination of the product/service 
and geographic markets, which are estab .. 
lished simultaneously. Arguably, market 
119 
definition is an objective, economic con .. 
cept relying on various quantifiable factors. 
The approach to market definition should 
be the same whether used under the Merger 
Regulation to assess market position under 
Article 85 to determine appreciable effect98 , 
under Article 86 again to assess market 
dominance, or under block exemptions 
regulations to determine market share 
thresholds,99 with the concession that the 
Community courts or the Commission may 
assign different weight to the factors in de .. 
termining market share. Up until now some 
Article 86 cases give the impression that 
markets have been defined very narrowly, 
to "fit" the alleged abuse.100 
The most noticeable difference be.-
tween the Community courts' and the 
Commission's manner of assessment is that 
the Court relies on a legal approach 101 , 
whereas the Commission prefers quantita .. 
tive econometric tests. The courts have a 
two.-pronged test to define the relevant 
market: The basic test is that of inter .. 
changeability of the product or service con .. 
cerned from the perspective of the 
consumer (demand substitutability). 
Where there is no such demand substitut.-
93. Council Regulation of December 21, 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [1990) OJ L 257/14. 
94. Here the need is less apparent as the element of appreciable effect is unwritten. , 
95. See Langnese. 
96. Regarding the indispensability of economic analysis for market definition see Derek Ridyard "Using economies in merger control 
cases", [1997] European Counsel, Vol. 2, issue 3, p. 45 et seq. 
97. W. M. Landes and R. A. Posner, "Market Power in Antitrust Cases", (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review937 at 938. 
98. Langnese, supra. 
99. See specialization and technology transfer block exemptions. 
100.James S. Venit, Market Definition: The Relevance for Article 86 of the commission's Practice under the merger Regulation, in a 
speech given at the 1996 IBC EC Competition Law Conference; see the Soda Ash cases (/C/ and paragraph 42 of Solvay in 
specific infra quoting Case 22178 Hugin v. Commission [1997] ECR 1869. 
101.See Case 247/86, A/sate/ v. Novasam, [1988] ECR 5987 and Tetra Pak lntemational v. Commission, [1996] ECR 1-5987. 
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ability, the courts apply an alternative text: 
They then determine whether, from the 
viewpoint of the suppliers, these can read .. 
ily switch their resources so as to produce 
and supply demand substitutable products 
(supply substitutability) .102 There is a pre .. 
sumption that there is a sufficient degree 
of interchangeability between all the prod .. 
ucts forming part of the same market in so 
far as a specific use of such products is con .. 
cerned. 103 In contrast to the courts' ap .. 
proach, the Commission Notice takes an 
openly economic approach to defining the 
relevant market. 
It should be noted that market defi .. 
nition may also be of impor-tance for the 
legal appreciation of competitive conduct 
in neighbouring markets. Thus, in Tetra Pak 
it was found that if an undertaking has a 
dominant position in one market and abuses 
this position in a closely related market, 
under the Court's broad interpretation of 
Article 86, this is an abuse of a dominant 
position even in the absence of a dominant 
position in the neighbouring market. Tetra 
Pak resulted in a record 7 5 million ECU fine. 
In defining the relevant market, one 
must establish the relevant market and cal .. 
culate the appropriate market share. Mar .. 
ket share tests by their very nature 
introduce definitional problems. Inherent 
in these tests is the possibility of differing 
interpretations between the Commission 
and the parties· about the relevant market 
102.1bid. Tetra Pak. 
Gerhard i.Aule 
in which the market shares are to be meas .. 
ured. The Notice on Market Definition sets 
out a list of factors ·that should be taken 
into account in defining the relevant mar .. 
ket, but this still leaves many issues open. 
It is not simply the definition of the market 
itself but also the calculation of the shares 
which is problematic. Measurement of 
market share creates particular problems in 
case of vertical agreements. For example, 
how should the market share of a supply 
agreement for components which are sub .. 
sequently incorporated into other products 
that are offered for resale be calculated? 
What if the components, but not the end 
product, are subject to a block exemption? 
Is the relevant market that of the campo .. 
nents, the finished products or both? The 
problem is particularly pointed for new tech .. 
no logy. 
To avoid as many problems as possi .. 
ble when conducting transactions relevant 
to Article 85 and 86 or the Merger Regula .. 
tion, business persons should be advised in 
all the more complex antitrust matters, to 
have an independent market analysis done 
by a well .. known and highly respected in .. 
ternational market research institute. 
II. Anti-Dumping Policy 
Recently both legislation and imple .. 
mentation of Community anti .. dumping 
policy have undergone important 
changes.104 Firstly, the CFI assumed com .. 
103. Ca~e. 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche vCommission [1979] ECR 461, [1979]3 CMLR 211. 
fp4:$~"{~fthe term and the historical development of anti-dumping: Gerhard Laule, Das Europaische Anti-Dumping-Zollrecht, 
· · '· Entwidklung und ausgewahlte Probleme, in: Die Europaische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft auf dem Weg zum einheitlichen Binnenmarkt 
und.z~r Steuergemeinschaft im Jahr 1992, Universitat des Saarlandes, Europa lnstituWortage, Reden und Berichte aus dem 
Eurbfja~lnslitut/Nt 146 (Georg Ress, Michael R. Will, ed. 1988), p. 47 et seq. . 
RevistadaFacutddde'de,Direito da UFRGS, v. 15, 1998 
New Trends in European Community lAw 
petence for applications for the annulment 
of regulations and decisions in the field of 
anti .. dumping. 105 Secondly, the "New Anti .. 
Dumping Regulation"106 was adopted. A 
third development, which has brought 
about important changes, is the GATT 
Panel Report focusing on a dispute settle .. 
ment procedure brought by Japan against a 
definitive anti .. dumping duty imposed by 
the European Council on Japanese origin 
audiocassettes.107 
A. Overview of CFI's 
Jurisprudence since being 
awarded Jurisdiction over 
Anti-dumping Matters 
NTN Corporation and Kayo Seiko Co. 
Ltd. v. CounciP08 was the first anti .. dumping 
case to be decided under the CFI's new ju .. 
risdiction over anti .. dumping matters. It 
concerned an appeal by two Japanese firms 
against a European regulation imposing 
definitive·anti .. dumping duties on ball bear .. 
ings larger than 30 mm from J apan.109 To 
the satisfaction of all but the European in .. 
stitutions, it heralded a new era in Euro .. 
121 
pean jurisprudence in the field of anti .. 
dumping. 
The approach of the CFI is that of 
an independent judiciary with a meticulous 
factual approach.ll0 This was seen as are .. 
freshing change to the Commission's and 
Council's habit of permitting external po .. 
litical considerations to prevail over the le .. 
gal and economic issues. 
The ECJ traditionally had limited it .. 
self to a superficial examination of whether 
or not the Commission could have reason .. 
ably come to the challenged decision. The 
traditional grounds for annulment, if any, 
of a Community measure in the field of anti .. 
dumping had been procedural. Annulments 
on substantive grounds were hardly conceiv .. 
able as the ECJ systematically refrains from 
reviewing "complex economic evaluations" 
by the Community institutions. 
The CFI so far has gone much fur .. 
ther. It concentrates on the facts and relies 
on the GATT Anti .. dumping Code. 111 
Thus, for example, in NTN, the CFI relied 
a WTO provision on anti .. dumping evi .. 
105. As of March 15, 1994, the CFI assumed competence for applications for the annulment of regulations and decisions in the field of 
anti-dumping, pursuant to Council Decision No. 94/149/ECSC, EC of 7 of March 1994 amending Decision ~3/350/Euratom, 
ECSC, EEC amending Decision 88/591/ECSC, EEC, Euratom establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 
OJ 1994, L 66/29. 
106. Council Regulation No. 3283/94 of 22 December 1994, OJ 1994 L 349/1 ; as subsequently amended in Council Regulation No. 
355/95 of 20 February 1995, OJ 1995 L 41/2, and in Council Regulation No. 1251/95 of 29 May 1995, OJ 1995 L 122/1. 
107.Council Regulation No. 1251/91 of 13 May 1991, OJ 1991 L 119/35, C-177/87 Sanyo Electric vCounci/[1992]1-1535; C-69/89 
Nahojima All Precisions vCouncil, [1995]11-1381. 
108.Joined Cases T-163 and 165/94, NTN Corporation and Koyo Seiko Co. Ltd. v. Council, [1995] ECR 11-1381. 
109.Council Regulation (EEC) No 2849/92 of September 1992 modifying the definitive anti-dumping duty on ball bearings with a 
greatest external diameter of 30 mm originating in Japan imposed by Regulation (EEC) No 1735/85, OJ L 286/1. 
110. This approach is precisely in line with the CFI's paper on aspects of the Maastricht Treaty in which it supports an independent 
judiciary. See Rapport de Ia Cour de Justice sur Certains Aspects de I' Application du Traite sur I'Union Europeenne, Luxembourg, 
May 1995. 
111. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade 1994 in Annex 1 A to the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. 
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dence requirements and, on that basis, 
emphasized that a threat of injury must be 
based on facts and not merely on possibili.-
ties, conjecture or allegations.112 The CFI 
meticulously conducted a fully .. fledged sub .. 
stantive review of the facts and mercilessly 
branded the Commission's superficial analy .. 
sis thereof by quashing the Commission's 
decision. 
Such a painstaking factual review of 
an institution's findings in the field of anti.-
dumping had been notably absent from the 
ECJ's rulings. 113 Its introduction into Com .. 
munity jurisprudence means greater legal 
guarantees in anti.-dumping proceedings. At 
the same time, the intensification of judi .. 
cial review has a deterring effect on the 
Commission and on the Council. Since 
NTN, business persons involved in anti.-
dumping matters should be encouraged 
more than before to produce as much eco.-
nomic evidence on point as possible and to 
refine their methods of presentation to the 
Commission of such evidence. 
A further change was the CFI' s ap.-
plication of the GATT Anti.-Oumping 
Code. This could mean an increased reli.-
ance by the CFI on GATT law. 
112. GATT Anti-dumping Code Article 3(7). 
Gerhard LauZe 
The CFI also sent a time.-related 
warning to the institutions: An anti.-dump.-
ing investigation must not extend beyond 
a reasonable period, to be determined in the 
light of the circumstances of the case; the 
one.-year period mentioned in Article 7 (9) 
(a) of the basic anti.-dumping regulation was 
only a guideline and not mandatory. 114 
The above explanations show that in 
the past it had been far too simple for the 
Council to decide in favour of protection 
of inefficient Community industries. The 
substantive and fair approach of the CFI 
compels the institutions to be more exact 
in their fact.-finding, fairer in their proce.-
d ure and more aware of the GATT 1994 in 
their legal appreciation. 
In addition, it has to be mentioned 
that in contrast to NTN there is the NMB 
case where the CFI took a step back in the 
depth of their factual analysis. 115 Their 
analysis was reminiscent of the ECJ's main 
Banana judgment.U6 Essentially the CFI 
based its decision on whether the anti.-
dumping measures taken were "manifestly 
inappropriate" having regard to the objec.-
tive which the competent institution was 
113. The ECJ has tended away from such an approach, favouring to make decisions on clear-cut procedural and other legal issues. 
See for example Case C-104/90 Matsushita Electric Industrial v. Council [1993] ECR 1-4981, and Case C-216/91 Rima 
Electrometalurgia v. Counci/[1991] ECR 1-6303. 
114. /d. at points 119 to 125. The Council had argued that in Case C-121/86 Kai Naftiliakon v. Counci/[1989] ECR 1-3919, and the Court 
had not objected to a delay of four years. The CFI stated that the one-year time limit for completing an investigation in an anti-
dumping procedure is only a guideline. The investigation must not extend beyond a reasonable period, which is to be determined 
in light of individual circumstances. In the NTN & Seiko cases the market was one the Community institutions knew well and the 
last review of it had been completed in ten months. See Article 7 (9) (a) of Regulation No. 2423/88 (the basic anti-dumping 
regulation). 
115. Case 162194 NMB France and others v. Commission [1996] ECR 11-427; C-156/87 Gestetner Holding v Council and Commission 
[1990] 1-781; C-133/87, C-150/87 Nashua vCommission [1990] 1-719. 
116. Case 280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR 1-4973, point 94. 
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required to pursue117 •118 It must be empha .. 
sized, however, that the applicants have 
failed to describe the effects the decision in 
question would have had on their economic 
and financial situation. The applicants sub .. 
mitted the question of the legality of the 
measure taken rule for review without con.-
testing the various calculation methods and 
figures arrived at by the Commission. The 
CFI found that it was therefore not in the 
position to assess, as part of the judicial re .. 
view, the real economic impact of the con .. 
tested measure. Thus the Court's review 
was limited to considering only a question 
of law which the applicants had themselves 
separated from the economic context of the 
case. 
Therefore, in spite of the NMB case 
it is certain that, since the CFI has had ju.-
risdiction over anti.-dumping matters, the 
standard of review has been stricter. It is 
the complainant's duty to make certain that 
the CFI receives the opportunity to con--
duct its rigorous analysis. 
B. The "New" Anti-Dumping 
Regulation 
The "new" anti.-dumping regulation 
is nothing revolutionary and addresses re.-
current problems. Three of these problems 
having arisen in recent jurisprudence are 
of strong relevance to international busi.-
ness: individual treatment in case of exports 
117./d. at points 69 and 70. 
123 
from non.-market economics, anti.-circum .. 
vention measures, and references to third 
countries in case of non.-market econom .. 
ics. 
1. International Treatment 
Granting individual treatment to 
exporters from non.-market economies 
(NMEs) means that the dumping margin is 
sought to be determined on a case.-by.-case 
basis and that, where appropriate and pos.-
sible, the anti.-dumping duty is fixed for each 
exporter individually. This topic of indi.-
vidual treatment is again of widespread in.-
terest in light of the imposition 
anti.-dumping duties on exports from the 
People's Republic ofChina119 and the great 
extent of foreign manufacturing investment 
into China and Vietnam. The Commission 
usually imposes a uniform anti.-dumping 
duty on all exports originating in NMEs on 
a country.-by.-country basis. Regarding 
State.-trading countries, the Commission 
generally determines one global weighted 
average anti.-dumping duty for all export.-
ers without regard to their individual cir.-
cumstances and uses a third country market 
economy as the basis to calculate the "nor.-
mal value", i.e., in non.-legal terms, the do .. 
mestic price of the product concerned. The 
underlying policy is based on the assump.-
tion that exporters in State.-trading coun .. 
tries are not independent from state 
118 •. The basic anti-dumping regulation was adopted by the Council as part of the common commercial policy which was characterized 
by a wide discretion in its implementation which necessarily extended to the adoption and implementation of the basis regulation. 
This latitude enjoyed by the legislature corresponds to that which the institutions had when adopting specific anti-dumping meas-
ures pursuant to the basic regulation. Ibid. 
119. See, e.g. Footwear from China and Indonesia, Regulation 165/97 (1997) OJ L 29/3; Handbags from China, Regulation 209/97 
(1997) OJ L 33/11; Ring Binder Mechanisms from China, Regulation 119/97 (1997) OJ L 22/1. 
Revista da Faculdade de Direito da UFRGS, v. 15, 1998 
124 
influence. The objective is to avoid circum, 
venting anti,dumping on exports from non, 
market economies duties by routing exports 
through an exporter within that economy 
who was granted a lower anti,dumping 
duty.12o 
There had been cases in the early 
1990s where company,specific anti,dump, 
ing duties were imposed under the "indi, 
vidual treatment" policy. Recently, in the 
foundation laying cases of Small Screen 
TVs121 and Bicycles, 122 the exporters from 
State,trading countries in vain tried to sat~ 
isfy the Commission that state influence was 
minimal and that the companies' export 
policy was exercised autonomously. 
Individual treatment is a legitimate 
policy.123 It should be granted in order to 
avoid unjustifiable interference with the 
rights of companies who in their business 
activities are independent from the State, 
trading country. 124 A working paper re, 
thinking the approach to individual 
treatment has been circulated to the Mem, 
ber States. It proposes a more flexible and 
fairer approach and is endorsed by Sir Leon 
Brittan, Vice President of the Commission, 
who wants to rationalize anti,dumping 
Gerhard Laule 
procedures so that they take account of the 
commercial interests of the EC. 125 
The WTO rules (Article VI of 
GATT 1994 and the Anti, Dumping Code) 
allow importing countries wide discretion 
in applying anti,dumping duties to NMEs. 
Legally, the Community's methods seem 
difficult to challenge. It should be noted, 
however, that Community law and practice 
are more stringent than the law and prac, 
tice of other countries. For example, it ap, 
pears that several countries are now treating 
China as a market economy. 
2. Anti-circumvention Measures 
A recurrent problem in anti,dump, 
ing anti, circumvention and standing of pri, 
vate companies pursuant to Article 173 (5) 
of the EC Treaty to challenge anti, circum, 
vention measures before the Community 
courts. 
This is illustrated in the Sinochem 
case. 126 As soon as the Community institu, 
tions realize that exporters may have such 
standing, this enhances the influence of the 
exporters before the institutions, for exam, 
ple in regard to access to the Commission's 
120. See Case T-161194 Sinochem Heilongjiang v. Council [1996] ECR 11-695. 
121. Small Screen Televisions, Regulation 2093/91 OJ 1991 L 195/1 (Definitive Duties). 
122. Regulation 2474/93 OJ L 228/1, upheld in a Judgment of the CFI of September 25, 1997, Case T-170/94 Sahnghai Bicycle 
Corporation (Group) v. Counci, not yet officially published. 
123. See Coun~il Regulation No. 384/96 on the protection against dumped imports from countries not member of the European Com-
munity: OJ 1996 No. L 56, p. 1; amended by Council Regulation No. 2331/96 of December 2, 1996, OJ 1996 No. L 317, p. 1. 
124. See Michael Sanchez Rydelski, Individual Treatment in EC Anti-dumping Cases Concerning State-trading Countries, (1997) 
EuZW Europaische Zeitschrift tor Wirtschaftsrecht 138. The criteria defining a company as independent from a State-trading 
country as set out in recent decisions is as follows. The company must show that it is: Owned in the majority by a foreign investor, 
a profit oriented entity, freely able to transfer profits outside of the State-trading country, independent in running its business and 
able to set its export prices autonomously. 
125. See Sanchez Rydelsky id. at preceding footnote quoting the Financial limes of 1 October 1996, page 5. 
126.Case T-161/94, Sinochem Heilongjiang v. Council(1996); C-171/87 Canon vCounci/[1996] ECR 11-695. 
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file. In Sinochem, the CFI recognized the 
standing of the Chinese producers and ex, 
porters. The Commission had argued in 
vain that applications for annulment of anti, 
dumping regulations lodged by individual 
companies operating in China, a NME, are 
inadmissible because the applicants are not 
individually concerned. The institutions 
had further argued that only the Chinese 
State or a state organization in charge of 
the vast majority of exports of the relevant 
products has standing to request the annul, 
ment of an anti, dumping regulation impos, 
ing duties. The CFI relied on the 
Sinochem's participation in the administra, 
tive investigation and particularly on the 
fact that the Commission treated the ap, 
plicants as any other participant in the in, 
vestigation. 
Another case, the Japanese Brother 
typewriter case, 127 best illustrates the impor, 
tance of the rules of origin, to the extent 
that the origin of a product is not solely 
determined by the place from where it is 
exported. Brother assembled typewriters in 
Taiwan and exported them to the Commu, 
nity stating that they were of Taiwanese 
origin. The Commission found them to be 
of Japanese origin and subjected them to 
the duty imposed on Japanese typewriters. 
Goods have the origin of the country where 
the "last, substantial, economically justified 
processing or working" was carried out.128 
125. 
The Court held in Brother that even 
mere assembly of parts from third countries 
could confer the origin of the country in 
which assembly takes place "provided that 
from a technical point of view such assem, 
bly represents the decisive production stage 
during which the use to which the compo, 
nent parts are to be put becomes definite 
and the goods in question are given their 
specific qualities." Provided that the tech, 
nical test is inconclusive, one can look at 
value added to see if "the assembly opera, 
tions in question result in an appreciable 
increase in the commercial, ex,factory value 
of the finished product." No concrete level 
of value added determining origin was 
given, but the Court did indicate that 10% 
was inadequate. 
The Community's "new" anti,cir, 
cumvention rules allow the Community to 
impose anti, dumping duties on products or 
parts used to make products imported into 
the Community whenever these products 
are found to be circumventing anti,dump, 
ing duties which the EU had previously 
imposed on like products. The most sig, 
nificant change in the Community's basic 
anti,dumping regulation129 deals with the 
extension of these anti, circumvention pow, 
ers to cover assembly operations in third 
countries .. This is of particular interest to 
Japanese companies with plants in South, 
East Asia, due to the value of the yen and 
127. Case C-26/88, Brother International GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Giessen [1989] ECR 4253. See also: Gerhard Laule, supra footnote 
105, p. 58 et seq. 
128. Article 24 of the Community's Customs Code; see also Council Regulation No. 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 which states: "Goods 
whose production involved more than one country shall be deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, 
substantial, economically justified processing or working in an undertaking equiped for that purpose and resulting in the manufac-
ture of a new product or representing an important stage of manufacture." 
129. See Article 13 (2) of that regulation. 
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because of anti.-dumping duties against di .. 
rect exports to the Community of certain 
products of Japanese origin.130 
In light of this modification, assem .. 
bly plants in third countries, South .. East 
Asia for instance, could find themselves 
subject to as many as three types of investi.-
gation: a new anti.-dumping case against 
products of that third country origin, an 
origin investigation to see if those products 
are really ofJapanese origin, and/or an anti.-
circumvention investigation under the 
Anti.-dumping Regulation. 
Judicious advice for companies with 
third.-country assembly plants is to make 
certain that the products manufactured in 
such facilities definitely have the origin of 
the country in which they are being assem .. 
bled so that the conditions for the applica .. 
tion of the anti.-dumping circumvention 
rules are not satisfied. While countries such 
as China and Vietnam have such low labor 
costs, the test for origin would/should be 
the technical one. Thus, local origin could 
be obtained due to the complexity of the 
local manufacturing process without the 
local value added amounting to a substan .. 
tial percentage of the manufacturing cost. 
3. Third Country References 
The extremely recent decision in 
Rotexchemie discusses the issue of reference 
countries, which are necessary when deal .. 
ing with determining normal value or in.-
Gerhard Laule 
jury in conjunction with a NME. It is noted 
that the Community institutions have wide 
discretion in choosing a reference country, 
but that the Court is to verify whether the 
relevant procedural rules were complied 
with, whether the facts on which the choice 
was based were accurately stated and 
whether there was a manifest error of ap .. 
praisal or a misuse of powers.131 The Coun .. 
cil and Commission are not required to 
consider every country proposed by the 
parties during an anti.-dumping proceeding, 
but they are required to examine in greater 
depth the proposals submitted to them if 
they ought to have doubts concerning their 
choice of countries. 
C. Japanese Origin 
Audiocassettes 
In 1995, a GATT Panel, established 
at the request of Japan, ruled that the de .. 
finitive anti.-dumping duty imposed by the 
Council on Japanese origin audio cassettes 
was in violation of the 1979 Anti.-dumping 
Code. The controversy involved the de.-
termination by the Commission of the do .. 
mestic sales value at an extremely low level 
in the distribution chain when sales are 
made through related parties, while export 
prices were established at higher levels. 
Japan claimed that adjustments should have 
been made to render the comparison be .. 
tween the domestic sales price and the ex .. 
port price fair. 132 
130. Please note that these provisions are not relevant if there are no anti-dumping duties in the first place. They are relevant where 
anti-dumping duties are imposed against countries other than Japan. For example, however, a Japanese company could have a 
subsidiary in Taiwan whose exports to the Community were subject to an anti-dumping duty and the anti-circumvention rules could 
be applied to another plant in, for instance, China. 
131. Judgment of the ECJ of May 29, 1997 Case C-26/96 Rotexchemie lntemational Handels GmbH & Co., not yet officially published. 
132. See, the GATT Panel Report on Audio Cassettes. 
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The Panel found that indirect costs 
could affect prices and held it unfair of the 
EC to deduct certain costs and profit in 
constructing the export price, but leaving 
similar expenses and profit in the normal 
value. 133 The Panel examined whether the 
price in one market was based on a price 
charged by a seller who performed addi .. 
tional functions entailing additional invest.-
ments and costs. The Panel decided that 
the comparability of the prices could be af .. 
fected, and that it might be necessary to 
make allowance in the form of an amount 
for profits related to the additional func .. 
tions performed. The Panel concluded that 
Article 2(9) and 2(10) of the Commissions 
former Basic Regulation were inconsist~nt 
with Article 2:6 of GATT as they precluded 
the making of justified allowances for dif .. 
ferences in indirect selling expenses and 
with respect to profits related to a differ .. 
ence in the function performed by the seller 
in the domestic and export markets, a dif .. 
ference that could affect price comparabil .. 
ity. 134 As the Commission normally took 
the sale of the first independent customer 
as the starting point, the Panel found it 
127 
necessary to make a distinction between 
related and unrelated steps in the distribu .. 
tion channel. 135 
The GATT report136 partially agreed 
with Japan and recommended that the EC 
be required to reconsider its determination 
in this investigation and to bring its legisla .. 
tion into conformity with GATT. On the 
basis of the pre.-WTO dispute settlement 
rules, the Community did not adopt the 
GATT report. 137 
III. Conclusion 
It has been shown that there are sev .. 
eral elements of uncertainty for foreign busi.-
ness strategies in the fields of antitrust and 
anti.-dumping under European Community 
Law. These elements of uncertainty are 
rooted in the strained relationship between 
a more factual and a more abstract, i.e. more 
political, approach. Although there are posi.-
tive signs for a more factual approach, for .. 
eign business persons always have to be 
aware of this strainend relationship when 
dealing with antitrust oder anti.-dumping 
matters. 
133. GATT Panel Report on Audio Cassettes paragraphs 370.372. Also see, Electronic weighing scales from Japan, OJ L 104/7 
(1993) and B. Hindley, Dumping and the Far East Trade of the European Community, 11 World Economy, 1988, 445; E. Vermulst, 
The Anti-Dumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC and the USA- Have Anti-Dumping Laws become a Problem in International 
Trade? In J.H. Jackson and E.A. Vermulst (eds.), Anti-Dumping Law and Practice- A Comparative Study, University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1989, at 451; P. Waer, Constructed Normal Values in EC Dumping Margin Calculations- Fiction, or 
a RealisticApproach?27 J.W.T. 4 August 1993,47, at 53. 
134. Ibid. at 113-114. 
135./bid. at 114. A Typical distribution channel is as follows: producer®distributor®wholesaler®dealer®end-user. 
136. EC Anti-dumping duties on audio tapes in cassettes originating in Japan, ADP 136, unadopted, 28 April 1995. 
137. Edwin Vermulst and Bart Driessen, Commercial Defense Actions and Other International Trade Developments XII: 1 July 1996-
31 December 1996, European Journal of International Law 1997 at 363. 
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